The lobby at eleven o'clock
I have seen it in São Paulo. I have seen it in Prague. I have seen it in a dozen other cities whose names do not matter.
The CEO flies in for a town hall, a performance review, or a look at a company we might buy. The day is scripted to the minute. Badges, agendas, handlers. Then the day ends. By ten or eleven at night the executive team is sitting in the hotel lobby, or out at a dinner someone local arranged, with no protocol at all. No one checking who is in the room. No one asking how the stranger at the next table knew the CEO's name.
And someone always knows the name. They show up, they sit down, they start a conversation. They are charming, well informed, and very interested. Most of the time it is nothing. A salesman. A fan. A local manager's cousin who wants a job. But I started my career as a cybersecurity analyst at Honeywell, and I learned early that you do not get to decide which conversation is the dangerous one. The other side decides that.
I spent 25 years running technology across 15 countries. In all that time I never once saw an executive team briefed on this before a trip. Not once. We protected the laptops better than we protected the people carrying them.
So when I read what happened to Jensen Huang, I was not shocked. I was angry. Because I have watched this door sit open for a quarter century, and this time the most valuable man in America walked through it.
What we know, and what we do not
Let me be careful here, because the story is still moving.
On November 8, Jensen Huang admitted an extramarital affair after reports tied him to Alice Huang, who ran Megaspeed, a Singapore company that became a major Nvidia customer. U.S. investigators suspect Megaspeed of moving Nvidia chips into China around export controls. Some officials suspect Alice Huang of working for Chinese intelligence. That has not been proven. Megaspeed denies wrongdoing. Beijing calls the whole thing a smear.
Nvidia's board opened an independent investigation. Then came reports of a second relationship, with an executive who reported to him. On November 12, Huang resigned as CEO of the company he founded.
And one more fact. The New York Times reports the President was told in October 2025 that Huang was close to Alice Huang and that U.S. intelligence suspected her. Two months later, higher grade chips were cleared for export to China. The information sat for a year while the man ran a company worth close to six trillion dollars at its peak.
I am not going to write about the Huangs' marriage. I do not know anything about it and neither does anyone writing about it. Jensen Huang made his choices, and he owns them. Two affairs, one with a direct report, is a firing offense at any serious company, spy or no spy.
But if the only lesson here is that a powerful man behaved badly, we will have learned nothing. The lesson is about everyone around him who knew what he was worth and did nothing to protect it.
Some people are infrastructure
Here is the uncomfortable truth. A handful of individuals in this country are not just executives. They are infrastructure.
Jensen Huang did not just run a chip company. For three years he personally decided which countries, companies, and governments got the hardware that trains AI. Whether you agree with his choices or not, that is the kind of influence a nation protects.
We protect the President with the Secret Service. We protect aircraft carriers with destroyers. We protect the formula for a fighter jet's radar with clearances and vaults. We did not protect the one man whose decisions shaped the AI race more than any general's.
Every intelligence service in the world knew his value before we admitted it to ourselves. That is why he became a target. Not because he was careless. Because he was worth it.
We classify the chips. We did not classify the man who decides who gets them.
Was he set up?
People keep asking me this, so I will answer it plainly. I do not know, and neither does anyone else writing about it.
What I know is the timeline. The President was briefed in October 2025. The story broke in November 2026, days after the midterms and a few weeks after Huang used his first ever post on X to argue against banning Chinese open source models. Somebody held this for a year and then it moved. Who, and why now, are questions the public deserves answered. Asking them is not a conspiracy theory. It is oversight.
And there is a second possibility people forget. If a foreign service placed someone close to him, the relationship was the operation and the leak may be the second act. Removing the man who decides where the chips go is a prize for more than one government.
Either way the question comes back to the same place. Our system knew, and it did not act.
Too close to the flag
There is an older lesson underneath this one. Business and government each answer to the public, but for different things. A company owes a return and a product. A government owes protection and a fair set of rules. The moment the two get too close, both stop doing their jobs.
Look at the last eighteen months. The CEO of Nvidia flew to Beijing on Air Force One. He sat in the Oval Office. When the story broke, the President called him an honorable guy who had done an amazing job for the country. The Commerce Department never put his most suspicious customer on the restricted list, and the Treasury Secretary reportedly had to confront the Commerce Secretary to ask why.
That is not a scandal about one man's private life. That is what proximity does. When a company gets close enough to power, warnings about it become inconvenient. Regulators hesitate. Export rules bend. A briefing in October gets filed in a drawer because acting on it would embarrass a friend in December.
The company learns the wrong lesson too. A CEO who can get the President on the phone stops believing anyone can tell him no. That is how a disciplined founder, thirty years in, ends up with two undisclosed relationships and a board that looked away.
I have seen this in other countries. Where the biggest company and the government share a table, you get oligarchs, monopolies, and rules that apply to everyone else. America is supposed to be the place where that does not happen. It stays that way only if business keeps its distance from power, and power from business. Access, donations, a seat on the plane: all of it has a price, and the bill always arrives.
What boards must do Monday morning
I have run companies and sat at enough board tables to know this: none of what follows is complicated, and none of it is expensive next to a trillion dollars of market value.
- Name your critical people. Every board should know which three to five individuals, if compromised, could damage the company or the country. Write the list down. Review it every year.
- Control access to the top. Who gets into the CEO's calendar, his dinners, his travel? Today that is a chief of staff with a spreadsheet. It should be a process, with vetting for anyone who gains repeated private access. Megaspeed was a customer. Customers get access. That is exactly how it works.
- Travel protocol for the executive team. A pre-trip briefing on the country. A rule about who joins after hours. Someone whose only job is to notice who is in the lobby. I never had one in 25 years. The cost is one salary.
- Due diligence on major counterparties, including the people. A company that took control of a key customer in 2023 and routed billions through Singapore deserved more than a credit check. It deserved a question about who owned it and who ran it.
- A rule the CEO cannot waive. Relationships inside the chain of command get disclosed, or the executive goes. Most companies already have this on paper. Nvidia's board apparently did not enforce it against the founder. That is the board's failure, not just his.
- Treat the founder like everyone else, then more so. The more a company depends on one person, the stricter the board must be with that person. Boards get this backwards. They relax for the star. The star is the target.
What Washington must do
The government cannot run a private company's security. It should not. But it can do four things it did not do here.
Decide what counts as a national asset. A short, published list of companies and roles whose compromise would hurt the country, like the critical infrastructure designations we already use for power plants and ports. Once you are on it, you know it, your board knows it, and you accept the obligations that come with it.
Give those companies a desk. If a CEO on that list gets a strange approach in a hotel bar, who does he call? There is no number. Put one in place: one office, one point of contact, reachable in an hour. The FBI already briefs university researchers on foreign recruitment. It can brief a CEO. If intelligence suspected Alice Huang in 2025, Jensen Huang should have been across a table from an agent within the week. Maybe he was. If so, nothing changed, and that is worse.
Put the embassy to work. When an ambassador travels inside a country, the embassy's security officer knows the route, the hotel, and who is likely to show up. When the CEO of a company on that list lands in the same country, nobody at the embassy knows he is there. That is backwards. A heads up before the trip, a thirty minute briefing on arrival, a name and a number for the week. I walked into embassies in 15 countries. The people there are good. They were never asked to do this.
Separate the warning from the politics. The warning reached the top in October 2025. The export decision went the other way in December. The system that is supposed to protect strategic assets bent to a commercial calendar. Congress is now asking why. That is the right question.
None of this touches anyone's privacy. A man can live his life. The country can still protect the position he holds.
The real lesson is the one I keep repeating
Step back from the scandal and look at the shape of it.
The entire AI economy was running through one company and, to a remarkable degree, one man. His judgment decided who got compute. His relationships became a national security question. His resignation moved markets in a day.
That is not a Jensen Huang problem. That is a concentration problem.
I have spent two years telling businesses and governments the same thing. Own your AI. Do not rent your future from a single supplier. Not from a cloud. Not from one chipmaker. Not from one country. A dental practice in Texas and the Republic of Gabon have the same exposure, at different scales: if the thing that runs your operation lives in someone else's building, their crisis becomes yours.
This week, the world's most important technology company found out that its single point of failure was a person. Every CEO reading this should ask the same question about their own company. Who is your Jensen? Who is protecting him? And what happens to you the morning he is gone?
The lobby is still open at eleven o'clock. Somebody is already sitting there.
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- 1.The Hill: Five takeaways from Nvidia's Jensen Huang scandal, November 12, 2026
- 2.Reuters: Former Nvidia CEO Huang had a relationship with a second employee, November 12, 2026
- 3.CNN: Jensen Huang resigns as Nvidia CEO; Colette Kress named interim CEO, November 12, 2026
- 4.The New York Times: timeline of the Huang affairs, including the October 2025 briefing, November 12, 2026
- 5.The Washington Post: How Jensen Huang's downfall unfolded, November 12, 2026
- 6.Axios: Bessent confronted Lutnick over Megaspeed, November 11, 2026
- 7.Fortune: Huang argues against banning Chinese open source models, July 2026



